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Introduction
In this chapter, we propose that one of the many possible ways that dance might embody
philosophic thought and discourse is via embodying ethical practice. Each author contributes a
different perspective on the relationship between dance and ethical activity. We invite the reader
to go through this account in two ways: as separate ideas and as interrelated thoughts.

Katan-Schmid views ‘dance’ as a metaphor for ‘embodied ethics’. She analyses dance as an
embodied activity of decision-making which regulates the tension between co-existing physical
dynamics. Following from the idea of ‘dancing’, she asks us to think of ‘embodied ethics’ in
performative terms – as a contemplative activity.

In her section, Bresnahan shows how dance practice provides examples of applied ethics within
traditional western philosophical categories of both virtue ethics and consequentialist ethics.

Houston argues that dance can encompass an ethics of care. She demonstrates how dance with an
ethic of care involves attentiveness, putting the person before the form, and for the dance artists
to give up a degree of control and autonomy over the work made.

As a mutual account, it is our view that dance contains practices – including but not limited to
dancing – that constitute ethical activity along all of the lines discussed above, be they
metaphoric of ethical action, applied directly towards a goal of human flourishing or societal
good, or an ethics of care for and with one another. Dance, on all of our accounts, contains
careful, thoughtful work on balance, self-development, and attentiveness to the needs of the
whole while contemplating, comprehending, and considering the essentials of any individual part
within. As such, we together have views that themselves exist in relations with one another and
are not in contradiction, although we are aware that we have by no means exhausted the
possibilities for dance as embodied ethics here. We invite you to think through dancing with us
as you try on the views expressed below.

Dancing as a Metaphor for Embodied Ethics
Einav Katan-Schmid

I ask the reader to view ‘Dance as Embodied Ethics’ as a metaphor. I invite an understanding of
one thing: ‘dance’, in terms of another: ‘embodied ethics’. As I sense it, this metaphor feels quite
actual. Moreover, I am aware that the shared instinctive feeling here – that dance interweaves
aesthetic knowing with ethics – is timely (see Bannon, 2018) and does not stand alone. George
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, for example, state that the metaphor of dancing is an alternative to the
current war-like culture of argumentation. They ask their reader to imagine ‘a culture where an
argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are seen as performers, and the goal is to perform
in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way’ (Lakoff/Johnson 2008 [1980], 5). I would like to

further develop this image and to suggest that ‘dance’ enables thinking of decision-making in
terms of embodied comprehension of dynamic interrelationships. Thus, tacit and contemplative
decisions are made beyond rigid definitions.

My notion of ‘dancing’ here is schematic. I draw from my knowledge – as fragmentary and
contextual as it is – a broad sense of ‘what dancing means’. I am aware that there are mock
combat dances, that not all training-cultures are ethical, and that some stylistic expressions do
not aim to please their viewers. However, I look here at ‘dancing’ as a general idea. In its
broadest far-reaching sense, ‘dancing’ is the human activity of moving aesthetically. Like all
other physical techniques, dance movements are both social and personal (Mauss, 1938). In
addition, while dancing, bodily movements are tailored to their aesthetic purposes and their
performance is neither practical nor existential (Valéry 1957 [1938], 1390-1391; Katan-Schmid
2016, 57-59). So, bodily movements in dance are self-referential and are conducted due to an
exchange between knowledge, sensitivity, and imagination. Thus as I view it, ‘dancing’ holds
three characteristics, which are significant for human understanding: it is personal, cultural and
reflective at the same time.

Take for instance a pirouette as a metaphorical component of ‘dancing’. In order to regulate
balance within a spin a dancer needs to swiftly move the leg into a Passé, to rise into a Relevé, to
find the position of the arms, stretch up and contract the core of the body and, critically, fix the
gaze onto one focal point while constantly moving and whirling. There is a technical know-how
– acquired through practice during the experiential history of training – but every time anew
there must be an activation of knowledge through feeling, interpreting, and fine-tuning to the

present momentum. A dancer jumps into the experience of a pirouette without having full control
over all the instants of movement in advance. Attentiveness is required to both the environmental
conditions and personal capacities in that moment so as to transform and direct the body into
effective movement. This process involves many small moments of decision-making which are
both embodied and consciously felt. The activity is contemplative; to dance is a process of
feeling, tacitly analysing and attuning dynamics.

American Pragmatist philosopher, John Dewey, defines the intelligence of an artist as
maintaining a perceptual balance between doing and undergoing (Dewey 1980 [1934], 47). In
line with Dewey’s definition of aesthetic perception, within dancing a dancer activates a
genuinely felt understanding of what the movement needs and accordingly regulates the aesthetic
balance between leading and responding to bodily forces. Achieving the pirouette demands a
correlation of the understanding of what is happening physically with the imagining of the future
development of this movement and so leads toward this development. Leading the progression of
movements, feeling their momentum, and undergoing the complexity of current dynamics are
relevant to a successful performance in any imaginable kind of dancing.

Maintaining aesthetic balance implies embodied agency (Bresnahan 2014a; Merritt 2015) of a
dancer who contemplates doing because it involves tacit attuned decision-making within the
feeling for the dance. In line with Lakoff and Johnson’s metaphor (2008 [1980], 5), the actual
work of dancing is an aesthetic labour of sustaining immediate understanding regarding what a
movement needs in order to lead into the fulfilment of that movement. ‘Aesthetically pleasing’,
as Lakoff and Johnson phrase in their metaphor as the goal of a dance, is a regulative idea, which

leads the aesthetic balance between directing dynamics to undergoing their current momentum.
This work demands a constant attunement of self-dynamics, knowledge, sensitivity, and an
understanding of the mutual related effect of all current undergoing aspects of the dance. Not all
movements aim for the spinning of the pirouette but in all dancing activities I can think of there
is a common process of adjustment between knowing and feeling in order to coordinate a
rhythmic flow (or a break of it) from a variety of dynamics. Beyond stylistic taste, graceful
dancing expresses the sensitivity of the embodied agency of the dancer who is responsible for a
continuum of swiftly made decisions and knowledge regulation.

‘Dance’ – or more precisely: ‘dancing’ as ‘embodied ethics’ – is an image worthy of inquiry
according to what we think of ethics in an ever-developing world of knowledge and of diverse
and disunited experiences (Bannon 2018, 28; Tong and Williams 2018). The image of dance
offers a view on the interrelation of dynamics in regard to traditions (like the technique of
performing a pirouette), the effective knowledge they embody (finding operative bodily tensions
for leading a spin) and the sensitivity for existing – always exceptional – conditions for
fulfilment (like regulating momentary feelings of collapse into a spin). In any act of dancing,
such knowledge must be re-enacted, re-comprehended and re-adjusted in relation to present
momentums and their progressions. What if we understand, for instance, social engagements as a
dance, with balanced communication as their regulative goal and ethics as the contemplative
activity of leading toward fulfilment? In this case ethical decision-making could be understood in
terms of sensitivity for diversity of dynamics, leading them toward a mutual exchange. The
metaphor of thinking on ‘embodied ethics’ in terms of ‘dancing’ leads me to think of the
embodied agency of a person who conducts decision-making within an enduring attentiveness

for the interrelations of co-existing, often disunited, social forces rather than a mere following
after pre-formed norms. In case we consider communication as a regulative goal, ‘embodied
ethics’ could be seen as an activity of recognizing one’s own knowledge, reconsidering and
readjusting it in relation to new information that manifests within an exchange.

Dance as Applied Ethics
Aili Bresnahan

In Western philosophy theories of ethics often fall under one of three traditional categories:
1. Virtue ethics theories of what is good for human beings, construed in terms of character
development or virtue (Aristotle’s idea of eudaimonia or human flourishing);
2. Consequentialist theories of what is good for others or of human society overall (as in, for
example, John Stuart Mill’s theory in Utilitarianism and, in contemporary form, John Dewey’s
philosophy);
3. Kantian deontological theories based on what is right in accordance with universal principles
that are true for human beings (see Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals).

It is not difficult to imagine how dance practices might be construed as ethical action on the first
two of these theories so it is only these two that I will address here. Regarding virtue ethics
theory, dance can contribute to human flourishing by helping human beings to develop their
physical, artistic, and civic capabilities. Dance can also help us to flourish by helping us to
experience a katharsis of the emotions. According to Aristotle, katharsis occurs when we

experience strong emotions such as pity or fear when watching tragedy, which helps to purge us
of negative and excess feelings (Aristotle (1984 [c. 335 BCE]), 230, 6.1449b22-27).

An example of dance as Aristotelian tragedy is exhibited in the photo below. Boston Globe staff
writer, Evan Allen, describes it this way:

At first, the dancers were joyful, leaping in circles and wrapping in a bear hug the
young man portraying slain 12-year-old Tamir Rice, who was shot to death by
Cleveland police at a playground in November 2014.
But then the drumbeat turned staccato, his body jerked, and the other dancers
rushed him in attack. He fell dead, his white shirt now smeared with black paint to
symbolize bullets. (Allen 2016)
Photo 1. CRAIG F. WALKER/GLOBE STAFF. Demetrius Burns laid on the ground while
playing the part of Tamir Rice during an interpretive dance at the Black Lives Matter rally
at the TD Garden [Boston].

Dance is also a practice with consequentialist benefits. First, the kind of dance regarded as fine
art can create ‘higher pleasures’. In Mill’s view, higher pleasures are those that require faculties
of intellect, education or feelings that are worth more due to their qualitative value than are the
lower pleasures of animals in their contribution to overall societal good (see Mill 2017 [1863], 56). However, it can be argued that even ‘lower’ forms of dance, such as some forms of pole
dancing, can contribute to the overall balance of societal pleasure.

In the late 19th century and early 20th century, John Dewey, held a consequentialist theory of
ethics which held that the results of an action for human life determines whether it is a moral
action or not (Dewey 1985 [1932], 295). His ethical theory also requires that these actions spring
from a human self that is motivated by the desire to help rather than harm others (Dewey 1985
[1932], 295). Dewey treats art, including the performing arts, as primarily aimed towards the
creation of heightened and unified aesthetic experiences. If we find that these experiences can
constitute what is good for human life, then it is a short step from this to the claim that dance is
ethical action (see Bresnahan 2014b). Indeed, Dewey acknowledges that dance can affect people
in ways that have deep ethical import for the creation of social good. Dewey points out, for
example, that:

Cooperation and sympathy are fostered by the activities of art. Some of these
activities are spontaneous, but most of them serve some definite social end and
are frequently organized for the definite purpose of increasing the unity and
sympathy of the group. The hunting dance or the war dance represents, in
dramatic form, all the processes of the hunt or fight, but it would be a mistake to
suppose that this takes place purely for dramatic purposes. (Dewey 1985 [1932],
p. 45)

Indeed, the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States – a grass-roots civil rights action
group ‘whose mission is to build local power and to intervene in violence inflicted on Black
communities by the state and vigilantes’ – has inspired dance, poetry and song as part of its
efforts to build community and morale among its members, as well as to express its social and

political message (Black Lives Matter website; see also Lavington 2016 and Schaefer 2016).
Dance troupes in connection with Black Lives Matter and other ethically-engaged groups have
used dance as a form of protest action in public spaces, such as in front of police stations and
other government organizations whose behaviour that they wish to change (see Saldivar and
Easter 2017). These examples show that dance can count as ethical action in the service of the
good.

Dance as Ethical Engagement and Connection with Others
by Sara Houston

1.

Nora’s eyes light up and she extends her hand upwards to a young man, who has his arm

outstretched toward her. He takes hers, swinging gently to the music of Frank Sinatra. Nora has
dementia. She always attends her care home’s weekly dance class. Her carers claim this is the
highlight of her week.

2.

Bienvenue has fled his homeland and now lives in a guarded refugee camp in Chad. He

thanks God that the dance company NDam Se Na comes every few months to dance with them.
Today the dance group freestyles, sharing a circle like a hip-hop cypher. Bienvenue’s torso
moves back and forward in rapid motion, his arms held out to the side as he steps into the ring,
taking over from another dancer who finishes with a helicopter spin. His fellow dancers clap and
sing out the rhythm.

3.

Eva dances several times a week. She has Parkinson’s Disease. She works with

choreographers attending her city’s arts programme. She shows me a film she’s made with
choreographer Fabio Novembrini. Her fine boned body, its delicacy enhanced by the tremors she
experiences, is buried in a pile of red-gold autumn leaves that crackle as she moves.

These vignettes are illustrations of socially engaged dance in action.1 They are examples where
dance artists or companies work with community groups through dance. I say ‘with’ and
‘through’ to emphasise that this is not dance being ‘taught’ to people as transmissions of
knowledge from teacher to pupil; rather they are illustrations of the use of movement to
communicate, to share movement ideas, to integrate, to create, to form relationships, to invent
together. These cases are instances of participatory art that are relational, where the sense and
intention of relating is one of the most important factors in the process of making dance.

The individuals featured above have all felt the disintegration of something that has been
integral to their sense of humanity, their sense of self as a capable actor: Nora’s mind, the loss of
home for Bienvenue, the deterioration of Eva’s control of her movement. To work as a dance
artist with people who experience vulnerability requires sensitivity to their needs. I suggest that
ethics of care (Noddings 1984) are required to address this in the making of art. Performance
scholar James Thompson describes art as having ethics of care, or a form of aesthetics of care; as

1

[i] Socially engaged dance and community dance are interchangeable terms. Here I use the term

socially engaged dance is used for this discussion in order to stress the notion of social
engagement on the part of the dance artist.

‘a set of values realised in a relational process that emphasise engagements between individuals
or groups over time’ (Thompson 2015, 437). This requires dance artists to be ‘attentive’ (Tronto
1993, 127) whilst creating work with dance participants. By ‘creating’, I am referring not only to
the process of making a performance work, but also the physical process of dancing, of
deliberately moving through and carving out space. The practice of attentiveness in socially
engaged dance contexts requires knowing or sensing how each participant is doing that day.
Particularly for people caught up in a situation that potentially makes them vulnerable, each day
may bring its own set of challenges and emotions. In order for their circumstances not to
overwhelm and for the dance session to be successful – in terms of being ‘safe’, welcoming,
open, respectful, inclusive and enjoyable – the practice of dancing needs to mould itself around
people, rather than being an inflexible structure into which people fit. This is a different
conception to much conventional dance teaching that often uses structures to mould bodies to the
technical demands of the form. Essentially, in socially engaged dance practice the person comes
before the form.

Person before form means, in practice, a number of different things.
For example, firstly, even before participants enter the dance space, the session needs to be
accessible to them: Are they physically able to get to the session and once there, can they get in,
or feel that they are catered for and welcome? How does Eva recognise that the opportunity of
working with a professional choreographer is for her? Where there are barriers to participation,
dance remains exclusive.
Secondly, the dance artist needs to be flexible in approach; to be open to jettisoning the session
plan or differentiating movement for individuals. If Nora’s symptoms are worse on any particular

day, she may not be able to do what was planned. Instead of assuming she cannot join in,
different movement can be imagined that retains the essence of the original idea. So, for instance,
instead of foxtrotting around the room, Nora might stay seated and wave a scarf to the lilt of the
music. The dynamic swing is still there in the trace of the scarf. The dance artist needs to come
to the space with the question ‘how might everyone in this room feel included in the dance?’,
rather than ‘how am I going to teach everyone to dance?’. Enacting notions of inclusivity and
openness marks out the session as socially engaged.

In facilitating people to feel included in the dance, it is also about the dance artist giving up
autocratic pretensions. Although there are varying degrees of control relinquished by the dance
artist within socially engaged dance, it is characterised by a sharing of creativity. Specifically, a
sharing of creativity here means participants making decisions, such as what movement they do,
how they move and themes used. The effect of this is that the participant may feel they have a
voice and presence.

The contemporary dance company NDam Se Na works in refugee camps. They specifically
embrace types of movements and dances familiar to the refugees and encourage participants to
create using their own ways of moving. With this principle, the company acknowledges the
cultural worth of these dances, thus signalling to participants the value of their own heritages and
knowledge. In taking a step back, the dance artist may instead offer a voice to a different ‘other’;
in this case, a group of people who have few legal rights or representation.

Performance projects also may be conducted with socially engaged values. Eva is performing in
Novembrini’s film; they have been in dialogue for some time. Novembrini attended Eva’s dance
sessions, participating alongside those with and without Parkinson’s. They have been sharing
ideas and Eva recognises her bodily need to keep moving, as well as her interest in artistic
practices. The decision for Eva to dance for Novembrini offered her an identity that was
separated from her disease but acknowledging her specific movement qualities influenced by
Parkinson’s.

Routinely working with attentiveness and encouraging embodied connectivity is an ethical
approach to dancing with others. This approach cultivates practices of listening and responding,
as well as a readiness to accommodate the ‘other’. It allows the dance artist to connect through
recognising the value of what participants bring to the process. Moreover, attending to access
and inclusion may more broadly address some of the barriers that traditional pedagogies in many
dance forms have erected that actively exclude or marginalise groups and individuals.

Conclusion
As shown above, it is our view that dance has an inherent capacity to promote embodied ethics in
a variety of ways: as metaphor for a balanced and attentive process of ethical decision-making,
as applied ethics in the service of what is good for human beings and as an ethic of caring for
others. Further, it is our view that this application is necessary. We hold that without extending
ethics from an abstract notion into applied understanding, without addressing in concrete ways
the inclusion of others who are often excluded from society, then ‘ethics’ is an ineffectual

concept - a disembodied framework - without application and true value for human life. The
dance practices we have discussed not only embody dancing then, but ethics; they help to give
ethics moving, breathing life. In this way, there is a sense in which we have made ethics dance.
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